Abstract: Social norms are usually neglected in economics because they are to a large extent enforced through non-market interactions and difficult to isolate empirically. In this paper, we offer a direct measure of the social norm to live off one's own income and we show that this norm has important economic effects. The stronger the norm, the more quickly unemployed people find a new job. This behavior can be explained by utility differences, probably due to social pressure. Unemployed people are significantly less happy than employed people and their reduction in life satisfaction is the larger, the stronger the norm is. (100 words) JEL classification: I31, J64
Introduction
Economic analysis has so far neglected social norms, although they are important in explaining many social phenomena. On the labor market, for instance, unemployed people's behavior may be influenced by a social norm to work and a strong social work norm may inhibit the emergence of a welfare culture. Thus, social norms may contribute to the understanding of moral hazard in social insurance or the puzzle that unemployment rates show large unexplained regional heterogeneity. 1 In this paper, we analyze the role of a social norm to work in the individual duration of unemployment and in unemployed people's subjective well-being. In line with the literature, the social norm is defined as "a behavioral regularity; that is [...] based on a socially shared belief how one ought to behave; which triggers [...] the enforcement of the prescribed behavior by informal social sanctions" . Unemployed persons are supposed to be sanctioned by social pressure from other members of their community and feel internal pressure to comply with the norm to work. This is summarized by the apostle Paul in his letter to the Thessalonians quoted at the beginning of this section. More recently, Elster writes: "There is a 3 social norm against living off other people and a corresponding normative pressure to earn one's income from work" (1989a: 121).
While progress is being made in including social norms into economic models, systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. 2 For an empirical analysis of the effects of norms, a measure of a person's beliefs about how one ought to behave is required. So far, research mainly relies on observed group behavior as a proxy for the group's norm. However, this is not satisfactory, because a group may behave in a similar way even in the complete absence of social norms.
Moreover, the channel of social interaction is often unclear and it is not possible to distinguish between social pressure and alternative interaction like imitation, learning or getting help.
In this paper, a measure for the social norm is applied that directly captures people's belief about appropriate working behavior. We consider citizens' beliefs as revealed in actual political decision-making in a country-wide referendum on the level of transfers to unemployed persons in Switzerland. The public discussion that took place before the vote, and the scientific analysis conducted after the vote, suggest that individual voting decisions reflect the strength of the belief that people should live off their own income.
We show that the more people in a community voted in favor of a reduction in unemployment benefits, the more quickly unemployed people find a new job.
In order to control for the effect of labor market conditions on citizens' voting behavior and unemployed people's job opportunities, we apply a stratified estimation technique. This technique allows unobserved characteristics of the regional labor market to be taken into 4 consideration -characteristics that may determine voting behavior as well as the duration of unemployment. In order to test whether the observed regularities in the transition rate to jobs are due to differences in the internalized work norms, rather than due to social interaction, the sensitivity of potential social norm effects is studied. We analyze whether social norm effects are weaker in larger and probably more anonymous communities, and for unemployed people for whom the local language is not their mother tongue.
As the two strategies cannot rule out an interpretation of the empirical findings that is based on social support, we additionally study unemployed people's individual utility. If a higher measure for the social norm mainly captures, for example, better access to job information and more help from neighbors, it would be predicted that unemployed people experience higher utility in communities with a stronger social norm. For utility, reported subjective well-being is used as a proxy indicator. Though this is an unorthodox approach, it is becoming more and more established in economics (Frey and Stutzer, 2002) .
We find that the stronger the social norm to work in a community, the lower the unemployed people's subjective well-being. This result is not consistent with an alternative interpretation that refers to social support. However, it is consistent with social interaction in the form of social pressure.
Up to now, this is the first paper combining measures on behavior, subjective well-being and poll results to test for the effects of social norms. We take advantage of the institutional situation in 2 Social processes in terms of social norms, social customs or conformity enter economic modeling, e.g., in the work of Akerlof (1980) , Bernheim (1994) , Besley and Coate (1992) , Cole et al. (1992) , Kandori (1992) , Lindbeck et al. (1999) , Solow (1990) and Young (1996) . For a survey, see Elster (1989b) .
Switzerland, where direct democratic decisions reveal individual preferences in areas other than market transactions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the various data sets used in this study and gives a short descriptive analysis. In section 3, the effect of the social work norm on the duration of unemployment is analyzed. Section 4 investigates the role of social norms in the subjective well-being of unemployed people. Section 5 draws conclusions.
Descriptive Analysis

The National Referendum on Unemployment Benefits
In order to study the effect of the social norm to work on individual behavior and utility, we first need a measure of the strength of this social norm. The measure should capture the belief that unemployed people ought to try harder to live off their own income. In studies of social norms, mainly observed group behavior is applied as a proxy for the group's norm so far, i.e. the "basic methodology (for analyzing neighborhood effects) involves regressing an outcome on the average level of that outcome (among a neighborhood.)" (Glaeser, 1999) . This is problematic, because actual behavior does not necessarily capture a person's beliefs on how one ought to behave.
Alternatively, an independent measure of people's beliefs could be ascertained by a questionnaire study (see the survey by Jones, 1997) . However, surveys on work values are mostly only conducted among small samples of the population. As a consequence, it is difficult to obtain an estimate of the strength of a certain social norm at the community level. However, it is necessary to have such a measure if one wants to test for the effects of social norms because, presumably, group influence is limited to a large extent by distance.
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The institutional structure of Switzerland helps to overcome the problem of obtaining a direct measure of the strength of the social work norm. Switzerland held a nation-wide referendum on the level of unemployment benefits that -as we will argue -captures the strength of the social norm to work. Swiss citizens are used to expressing their opinions at the poll. Direct democratic decision-making is very common in Switzerland, even at the national level. 3 Switzerland has held at least two national votes every year since 1967 (see Kobach, 1994) . Citizens openly discuss how to vote and can rely on ample coverage by the media of the issue at stake. Newspapers, for example, publish statements and voting recommendations of political parties and opinion leaders. 4 Switzerland, enjoying full employment until the early nineties, reacted strongly to a substantial rise in unemployment from 0.5% in 1990 to 4.5% in 1993. The government doubled the maximum duration of benefit eligibility from 1 year to 2 years and introduced an ambitious active labor market programs. Benefits are 70% of previous earnings for those with previous earnings exceeding Sfr. 4,030 (about US $ 2,500) and 80% of previous earnings for individuals with low income or individuals who have to support children. Benefits are the same all over the country. 5 Not surprisingly, unemployment insurance funds experienced large deficits. 6 To fight these deficits, the Swiss government cut unemployment benefits marginally as of January 1, 1997, by 3 In Swiss direct democracy, 50,000 voters can call for a referendum on any new law. For further information on the political institutions in Switzerland, see Linder (1998) or Steinberg (1996) . 4 Bohnet and Frey (1994) and Frey (1994) discuss the role of public discussion in the process of direct democratic decision-making, with an emphasis on the Swiss experience. 5 Unemployed job seekers are entitled to unemployment benefits if they are looking for work, did contribute to unemployment insurance for at least 6 months in the two years prior to becoming unemployed, and meet job search requirements. Those entering from non-employment may be exempted from the contribution (students, mothers, widows, etc.).
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3% for those with previously high earnings and by 1% for those with previously low earnings. In response, unions and a committee of unemployed people launched a nation-wide referendum, calling for direct approval or disapproval of a cut in benefits by the voters.
The vote was held on September 28, 1997. Until June 1997, public discussion in the main newspapers focused on financial issues. However, on June 10, 1997, the (former) vice president of the ministry of labor made a public statement that he believed that:
"At least two thirds of the unemployed are either drug addicts, alcoholics or work shy."
This statement incited a heated debate on the true causes of unemployment in Switzerland, i.e.
the degree to which unemployed people could find work if they wanted to. 7 The committee launching the referendum won by a narrow margin of 50.8%. Thus, 49.2% of voters approved of the reduction in unemployment benefits. According to the exit poll, the three main reasons given in support of a reduction in benefits were (i) financial issues (29%), (ii) that the unemployed cost too much; they free-ride on society; the government must do all they can to push the unemployed back into work (25%), and (iii) that the law is necessary; lowering benefits is good (21%) (Wisler et al., 1997: 18) . While the first reason is not directly linked to social norms, the second and third reasons can be taken as support of our presumption that differences 7 For example, on July 3, 1997, "Blick", the newspaper with the highest circulation in Switzerland, featured "The ten slick tricks of the unemployed" (to commit fraud); or on July 9, 1997, "TagesAnzeiger", one of the main newspapers in the area around Zurich, published an interview with an individual belonging to the Association of Swiss Artisans, stating that: "Society consists to a large extent of hedonists. Work annoys them; they would really like to get rid of it"; or on August 4, 1997, "Berner Tagwacht", one of the main papers in the Bern region, quoted an individual as saying: "There is not only a right to work, but also a duty to work. Otherwise, one part of society free-rides on the other part of the society working." Finally, in a personal interview at the labor office, an unemployed woman stated: "I lost There are large differences between communities in the percentage favoring a cut in benefits both across Switzerland and within regions (see Table A1 as well as Figure A1 for a histogram of the poll results across all Swiss communities). Across regions, the standard deviation in votes is almost 11 percentage points. Note that the within regions standard deviation is about 9 percentage points, i.e. more than three fourths of the variance across regions. 9 Strong variation within a region is an indicator that the poll results measure a highly idiosyncratic aspect of communities.
This can be understood as (i) Swiss communities being characterized by a large degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the central government 10 and (ii) social contacts occuring to a large extent within the communities.
We are aware that voting on unemployment insurance is to some extent instrumental, i.e. related to tax considerations, the chances of losing one's job, etc. (see Hassler et al., 2000) . However, the evidence that (i) public discussion before the vote on unemployment benefits focused on fraudulent behavior of the unemployed and (ii) the main reasons for supporting the cut in many friends because of unemployment. They think badly about anybody who doesn't have a job and say: 'If only one wants to work, one will find work.'" 8 Data on this statement was obtained in a survey of about 6,000 residents of Switzerland (Cotter et al., 1995) . Ideally, one would like to use data on this statement in the empirical analysis. However, the survey size prohibits obtaining a precise measure of the fraction that agrees with this statement across communities. 9 Here, 147 public employment service districts are used as region (see section 3 for a description of these regions).
9 unemployment benefits included the norm that "unemployed people should be encouraged to find work" shows that voting in this referendum may be better understood with a model of expressive voting behavior (see Brennan and Lomasky, 1993) . Accordingly, differences across communities in votes cast at the national referendum are a promising proxy for the strength of the social norm to work.
Duration of Unemployment
Data on the duration of unemployment is from the national unemployment register. It covers the entire inflow of unemployment in Switzerland in the six months following the referendum on unemployment benefits. The inflow of unemployment from October 1997 to March 1998 is then observed for an average period of one and a half years, until May 1999. There are several advantages to using this sample. First, all the unemployed individuals considered became unemployed after the referendum took place. Second, the sample is representative of the inflow of unemployment. Third, we have observations on duration of unemployment for more than 85%
of Swiss communities.
The data contains detailed information on individual characteristics, previous job and recent unemployment experience. The sample selection procedure considers the fact that individuals may choose to become unemployed. In order to rule out that the social norm affects inflow into unemployment, the analysis is restricted to unemployed people who did not quit their previous job. Additionally, we restricted the sample to unemployed Swiss and foreigners with permanent residence in Switzerland in order to grant equal benefit entitlement in the sample. 10 Communities decide on their own income tax and spend about one third of total public expenditure. Table 1 shows the median and the standard deviation of unemployment duration, split according to the strength of the social work norm in a community. The median duration of unemployment in the sample is 140 days or about 4.5 months. 11 Median unemployment duration is 27 days shorter in communities with a strong social norm to work (communities where the percentage of voters in favor of a cut in unemployment benefits is higher than the Swiss average) than in communities with a weak social norm to work (communities where the percentage is lower than the Swiss average). This difference does not control for other factors that determine duration of unemployment. Section 3 presents a multivariate analysis, which carefully considers differences in individual characteristics as well as in labor market conditions.
[ Table 1 about here]
Subjective Well-Being
Measures of subjective well-being can serve as proxies for "utility". They are captured in surveys on individuals' happiness or life satisfaction. As people are generally supposed to be the best judges of the overall quality of their life, it is a straightforward strategy to ask them about their well-being. In a number of studies, the validity of these answers has been documented. Happy people are e.g. more often smiling during social interactions (Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda, 1995) and are rated as happy by friends and family members (Sandvik et al., 1993) , as well as by spouses (Costa and McCrae, 1988 In this study, we consider the subjective well-being of employed and unemployed people. 13 The question on subjective well-being was as follows: "How satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?", with answers on a scale from one ("completely dissatisfied") to ten ("completely satisfied"). The data are part of a survey of over 6,000 residents in Switzerland, conducted by Leu, Burri and Priester (1997).
14 Previous literature has documented a detrimental effect of unemployment on psychological wellbeing. 15 Based on their study for Britain, Clark and Oswald (1994) state that "joblessness depresses well-being more than any other single characteristic (including important negative ones unaffected if more than 50% of spells of unemployment are completed and if the duration of censored unemployment spells is already longer than the median duration. 12 Related work on job satisfaction is surveyed in Warr (1999). 13 The sample is restricted to the 133 largest Swiss communities. This is necessary to restrictively control for the local labor market situation (see section 4). Disaggregated unemployment statistics are only available for these communities. 14 The data were collected between 1992 and 1994 in order to investigate the problem of poverty in Switzerland. Information is from personal interviews and tax statistics. Additional information includes demographic characteristics, employment status, income situation of the household and social contacts of the persons interviewed.
12 such as divorce and separation)" (p. 655). The effect of unemployment on happiness seems to be causal and is not due to unobserved individual specific characteristics, as is shown by Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) in their study using panel data for Germany.
The same robust result is found for Switzerland. 16 Table 1 shows that unemployed people report, on average, considerably lower scores for satisfaction with life (6.25) than employed people (8.14). However, not all the unemployed are less happy. There is a large variation in the reported life satisfaction scores. We argue that the social norm to live off one's own income is a major determinant of the variation in subjective well-being. Unemployed people experience disutility from not complying with the social norm and from the social pressure they are exposed to by their personal environment due to their deviating behavior.
Social pressure on unemployed people is expected to be higher in communities where a lot of citizens have voted for a reduction in unemployment benefits. Accordingly, the difference in life satisfaction between employed and unemployed people is hypothesized to be larger in communities with an above average strength of social work norm. In Table 1 , utility differences between employed and unemployed people are expressed separately for persons living in communities, where more (respectively less) than 49.2 percent of the voters (Swiss average) wanted to reduce unemployment benefits. The raw data show that in communities with the social norm above the Swiss mean, unemployed people report, on average, a 1.0 point lower satisfaction with life than in the rest of the communities. If the difference in subjective well-being between employed and unemployed people is considered, the gap in life satisfaction between strong and 16 For an extensive analysis and discussion, see Frey and Stutzer (1999 
Social Work Norm and Job Searching
The previous section clearly shows that unemployed people find a regular job more quickly and feel less happy when the proposed measure for the social work norm is strong. However, these effects attributed to the social norm to work could be due to factors other than the work norm:
Labor demand could be stronger in regions where the proposed measure for the social work norm, the percentage favoring a cut in unemployment benefits, is high. More generally, the fact that unemployed people maintain their status for a shorter period of time in a strong norm than in a weak norm environment could be due to omitted characteristics of the environment.
(ii) The effect of a strong social norm could be a spurious correlation, because individuals in strong norm regions may differ from individuals in weak norm regions. Differences in the duration of unemployment could then be due to internalized attitudes towards work rather than any kind of social interaction.
In this section, we first test for the effects of the social work norm on the duration of unemployment in a multivariate analysis. Then we address the two lines of competing explanations. Finally, we simulate the quantitative importance of the social norm effects.
In order to analyze duration of unemployment, we use the conventional Cox (1972) proportional hazard model. The proportional hazard model focuses on the "hazard", that is the probability that an individual changes his status in the next period of time as a function of the time spent in that 14 status. 17 For instance, the "job hazard" (or "transition rate to jobs") measures the probability that an unemployed person finds a job in the next period of time as a function of elapsed duration of unemployment. The basic assumption of the proportional hazard model is that covariates shift the hazard in a proportional manner. The proportional hazard model proposes the following specification for the hazard θ(t)
where t is elapsed duration, h(t) is the baseline hazard, x is (a row vector) of covariates and β is (a column vector) of parameters of interest. An important advantage of using the Cox proportional hazard model is that there is no need to assume a parametric structure for the baseline hazard; a fact that ensures consistent estimation of β under a wide range of circumstances. In all estimates, we report robust standard errors to take into account that errors may be correlated within communities (see Huber, 1967) . Table 2 contains the main results of the duration analyses. Panel A shows the effect of the proposed measure for the strength of the social norm to work on the transition rate from unemployment to a regular job for 76,770 unemployed people living in 2,550 communities. In the estimate, we control for a number of individual characteristics as well as for average monthly unemployment inflow rate in the third quarter of 1997. 18 The coefficient of the strength of the 17 Other duration models include the Transition Model (Horowitz, 1996) or the Accelerated Failure Time model (AFT). These models did not become as popular as the proportional hazard model, because they do not focus directly on the hazard (see the surveys by Kiefer (1989) Lancaster (1990) and Van den Berg (2000) ). 18 The unemployment inflow rate used is the average number of individuals that became unemployed between July and September 1997 as a percentage of the number of people in the work force in the municipality.
15 social work norm of 0.083 is to be interpreted such that unemployed people in communities with a social norm that is 10 percentage points stronger than average exhibit a transition rate to jobs that is larger by a factor of exp(0.083)=1.086. 19 Thus, the stronger the social work norm, the higher is the transition rate to jobs.
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[ Table 2 about here]
Correlated Interactions
Naturally, the environment of unemployed people also contains features other than the social norm to work. Thus, any estimated effect of the social norm may be biased. It may be what Manski (1993) termed a "correlated effect". This is the effect that individuals stemming from the same community behave similarly, not because of social interactions, but because they face the same environment. In order to test the sensitivity of the estimation results, characteristics of individuals' environment have to be controlled for.
In Panel A, we show the effect of the social norm, controlling for the average unemployment inflow rate. Unemployment inflow is included in order to take the state of the labor market into consideration as it is observed by the citizens. There are two reasons for working with the inflow rate rather than the unemployment rate. The inflow rate more closely captures differences across 16 communities in labor demand. Moreover, to the extent that social work norms affect unemployment outflow, it is preferable to find a measure of the labor market situation which does not contain information on the unemployment outflow. This is the case for the unemployment inflow rate, but it is not the case for the unemployment rate. The effect of the unemployment inflow rate is statistically significant and quantitatively important: a one percentage point increase in the unemployment incidence reduces the transition rates to jobs by 19.1%.
In a further test in Panel B, we display the estimated effect of the social norm, additionally controlling for five municipality characteristics, i.e. population in 1997, education and age structure, commuting behavior (latter values for 1990), and voting participation in the referendum. 21 The first three characteristics are intended to capture differences across municipalities in labor supply. E.g., the variables for the age structure at the community level measures differences in the propensity of people to enter or leave the labor market due to changes in labor market conditions. Community education structure is included in order to capture a major determinant of the transition rate to jobs that is missing in the individual data. The proportion of commuters is an indicator for the existence of an adequate number of jobs in the community in which people live, and thus for local labor demand. Finally, in Panel B, voting participation is taken into consideration, because there may be a correlation between the strength of the social norm and the probability that somebody expresses his or her opinion at the poll. 21 Education structure (two variables) captures the proportion of inhabitants with secondary and with tertiary education. Age structure (two variables) measures the proportion of people below 15 years of age and of old age pensioners. Commuting behavior reflects the proportion of workers that does not work within the community.
A comparison of the results in Table 2 Panel B with the results of Panel A reveals that the effect of the social work norm becomes slightly smaller if we control for additional features of the environment. However, the effect of the work norm still has a statistically significant and quantitatively strong positive impact on the transition rate to jobs. A social work norm that is ten percentage points stronger increases the transition rate to jobs by 7.0%.
With respect to the community control variables, the transition rate to jobs is found to be the lower the larger the community is, the more people have tertiary education, and the larger the proportion of commuters is. Unemployment duration is shorter the higher the proportion of inhabitants below 15 years of age, the higher the proportion of individuals who have completed secondary education, and the higher the voter turnout.
So far, correlated interaction for observed regional characteristics has been considered. However, duration of unemployment and voting behavior could also be systematically determined by unobserved regional properties. If poll results on unemployment benefits merely reflect regional job opportunities, the estimated correlations are to a large extent spurious. In order to test this alternative explanation, we allow differences in the proposed measure of the social norm to be driven by unobserved regional heterogeneity. With linear models, one would use region fixed effects to control for unobserved regional differences. With data on duration, a stratified estimation technique can be applied that not only shifts the base line hazard for each region, but allows for changes in the form of the base line hazard in the region itself. Thus, variation of the proposed measure of the social norm within a region identifies the effect of the social work norm.
See Ridder and Tunali (1999) for a discussion of stratified estimation.
Here 147 public employment service (PES) regions are used as spatial units. There are two main reasons for this choice: First, the PES regions were originally created to represent local labor markets. Second, because PES staff handles all the administrative procedures (registering, monitoring, and sanctioning), we control for idiosyncratic management of the unemployment insurance system. PES regions are very narrowly defined labor markets, both with regard to the number of workers covered as well as their spatial expansion. On average, a PES region consists of about 25,000 members of the labor force and covers an habitable area of about 170 square kilometers.
Panel C in Table 2 displays the results of the stratified estimation. 22 While the point estimate for the effect of the social work norm drops slightly from 0.068 to 0.054, it remains statistically significant at any conventional level of significance; a strong social norm to work increases the transition rate to regular jobs. Note that the effects of unemployment incidence, age structure, and commuting behavior change even more than the effect of the social norm.
The hypothesis that the model controlling for unobserved characteristics affecting job chances (Table 2 Panel C) can be reduced to the model that does not account for unobserved regional heterogeneity (Table 2 Panel B) is rejected. This means that stratification indeed controls for relevant omitted factors that are correlated with the proposed measure for the social norm and other explanatory variables. 22 See Table A2 for results regarding all covariates.
Contextual Interactions
It may be argued that differences in duration of unemployment merely reflect differences in unmeasured characteristics of the unemployed over and above the unobserved regional properties considered above: the findings might be due to internalized attitudes towards work rather than due to social interaction like social sanctioning. People with strong work attitudes are likely to vote in favor of a reduction in unemployment benefits. Moreover, the unemployed with a strong work ethic will search more intensively for a new job and be unemployed for a shorter period of time.
These two explanations are difficult to disentangle. First, it is often argued that a necessary precondition for the enforcement of social norms is that a proportion of the population has internalized the norm. Only then can the social dilemma of sanctioning norm deviating behavior be resolved. Thus, the working of a particular social norm relies to some extent on the fact that it becomes an internalized norm. Second, simple models of either internalized norms or social norms predict the same regularities in behavior.
In order to test whether social interaction rather than internalized work ethic generates the observed correlations, additional conditions have to be specified under which the proposed measure for the social work norm has distinct effects on the duration of unemployment. Here, two propositions are put forward: (i) To the extent that it is easier for unemployed people to shield themselves from social sanctions in large municipalities, the effect of the social norm to work is expected to be the weaker the larger the municipality is.
(ii) If social sanctioning happens to be largely verbal, the effect of the social work norm is expected to be the weaker the poorer 20 unemployed people's skills in the local language are. The propositions are tested in Table 3 .
Technically, interaction terms are included in the estimation equation in Panel C of Table 2 .
The results in Panel A of Table 3 show that the effect of the social norm to work is weaker the larger the community is. The main effect implies that the transition rate to jobs increases by 4.9%
if the strength of the social norm increases by 10 percentage points. 23 The negative interaction term shows that if municipality size is increased by 10,000, the effect of the social work norm on the transition rate to jobs decreases from 4.9% to 4.3%.
In Panel B, two interaction terms are included. The first term interacts the strength of the social work norm with the characteristic that the official language in the canton is not the mother tongue of the individual but his or her second language. 24 The second interaction term is for unemployed people who speak the local language neither as their mother tongue nor as their second language.
Thus the two interaction variables take the values for the strength of the social work norm if the criterion is given, and are zero otherwise. The results show that the effects of the indicator for the social norm are smaller if an unemployed person's skills in the local language are lower. For the first interaction effect, the effect of the social norm is reduced from 10.7% to 2.3%. If the local language is neither the mother tongue nor the first foreign language, the net effect is even negative. 25 These results might indicate that norm enforcement is more difficult if verbal interaction is hampered by language problems. The results might also indicate that people who 23 The main effect is calculated for an individual living in the municipality with median size. 24 The four official languages in Switzerland are German, French, Italian and Romansh. 25 The result that the effect of the social norm on the transition rate to jobs is lower for individuals who do not speak the local language as their mother tongue also holds in the subsample of the unemployed Swiss.
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are less familiar with the local language are also less well integrated in the community and thus less exposed to social sanctions.
[ Table 3 about here]
In sum, the effects on the duration of unemployment of our proposed measure for the strength of the social norm to work are the smaller
• the larger the community in which the unemployed individuals live, and
• the weaker their command of the local language.
These results are consistent with social interaction within communities that has an influence on unemployed people's behavior on the labor market. Table 4 contains simulations to assess the quantitative importance of the strength of the social work norm for the duration of unemployment. The simulations are based on the estimates presented in Table 2 Panel C. First, the expected change in duration of unemployment is reported that is due to a change in the indicator for the social work norm by one standard deviation for an individual with average characteristics. Second, in order to assess the relative size of the effect, This shows that the interaction terms do not merely capture differences among Swiss and foreign job seekers in the ability to find jobs.
Quantitative importance
simulations for the relation between the duration of unemployment and apprenticeship training, as well as the replacement rate, are conducted.
The social norm to go about paid work reduces unemployment duration substantially. For instance, the average individual has an 11.2 days shorter duration of unemployment due to an increase in the strength of the social norm by one standard deviation. Thus, for an increase of one standard deviation, the effect of the norm is about 8% of median unemployment duration (140 days).
[ Table 4 about here]
At the bottom of Table 4 , quantitative results for apprenticeship training and the replacement rate are presented for an assessment of how large the effect of the social work norm is compared to two common policy prescriptions to reduce unemployment duration. 26 With respect to apprenticeship training, simulation results show that unemployment duration is 51 days longer for individuals who have never done an apprenticeship compared to individuals who have done a long apprenticeship. 27 Individuals who are granted 80% replacement of the previous wage are expected to be unemployed 12.2 days longer than individuals with a replacement rate of 70%.
This effect is somewhat larger than the findings in the literature that a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate increases unemployment duration by about one week (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991) . Thus, the social norm to work has less impact than apprenticeship training. However, a one standard deviation increase in the proposed measure of the social norm to work is just about as important in explaining unemployment duration as a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate.
Social Work Norm and Subjective Well-Being
The previous section shows that an increase in the proportion of people who voted in favor of a reduction in unemployment benefits is associated with a marked decrease in the duration of unemployment ceteris paribus. However, the analysis of data on behavior could not answer what kind of social interaction determines the identified effect.
Two scenarios are possible: (i) The proposed measure for the social norm to work may reflect differences in availability of information on new jobs and help from other people in finding a job.
Moreover, it may reflect the fact that imitation of successful job search strategies is more prevalent in high norm communities. (ii) In communities with a strong norm, unemployed individuals may be subject to informal social sanctions because they deviate from the social norm. 28 It seems impossible to discriminate between these two explanations with data on behavior.
However, with data on utility, one could test whether the identified correlation reflects information aspects of the labor market or social pressure. While the explanation based on social 24 pressure implies that unemployed individuals will have lower utility in communities with a strong social work norm, the first scenario does not imply a systematic relationship or, if at all, then a positive relationship between the proposed measure and utility. We use data on self-reported subjective well-being (see section 2.3) to separate the two competing scenarios for the investigated effects on duration of unemployment. It is tested whether unemployed people report lower satisfaction with life the higher the proposed measure of the social work norm is.
In the following econometric analysis, we apply weighted ordered probit models, because the dependent variable contains rank information on subjective well-being. We use a robust estimator of variance, as random disturbances are potentially correlated within the same community.
29 Table 5 presents the results. A positive coefficient indicates that the probability of stating higher life satisfaction increases. The marginal effect indicates the change in the percentage of persons belonging to a utility level of 9 or 10 when the independent variable increases by one standard deviation. 30 In the case of dummy variables, the marginal effect is evaluated with respect to the reference group. Applied to the effect of being unemployed, rather than employed, the probability of a person stating a level of subjective well-being of 9 or 10 is 34.9 percentage points lower.
The results for the social work norm follow the differences-in-differences strategy applied in Table 1 . The first coefficient in Panel A captures the effect of the social norm to work on life 29 Ignoring the clustering in the estimation model is likely to produce downward biased standard errors, due to the effects of aggregate variables on individual data (Moulton, 1990) . To get unbiased standard errors for the aggregate variables on social norms, the communities are used as sampling units. Due to clustering and stratification in contrast to pure random sampling, weights are necessary to get unbiased point estimates. Weights are proportional to the inverse of the probability of being sampled. In addition, the weights are adjusted to the demographic structure in 1992. 30 Alternatively, the marginal effect indicates the change in the probability of belonging to a utility level of 9 or 10 when the independent variable increases by one standard deviation.
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satisfaction for all the people sampled. A small positive effect is estimated. Thus, work seems to contribute more to satisfaction with life where people share a stronger social norm to work. The difference in well-being between employed and unemployed people due to variation in the strength of the social work norm is revealed by the interaction term for strength of norm and individual unemployment. The coefficient of this interaction variable is statistically significantly negative. Thus, the higher the proportion of people in a community who are in favor of a cut in unemployment benefits, the lower the satisfaction with life of unemployed people living in the same community (compared to employed people). The reduction itself is massive. Estimating the marginal effect, a one standard deviation higher proportion of voters in favor of lower benefits reduces the probability of an unemployed person reporting a happiness score of 9 or 10 by approximately 19.9 percentage points. This result supports the second scenario that social interaction is due to social pressure and does not support an alternative explanation of the behavioral regularities based on differences in exchange of information.
[ Table 5 about here]
It may be argued that the effect of the variable "strength of social work norm" is spurious because the variable mainly measures the local unemployment situation. Or it may be claimed that the strength of the norm depends on the extent to which the members of a community actually adhere to it. Thus, when unemployed people suffer from reduced self-esteem, as they violate the norm to work, the reduction in subjective well-being is the smaller, the larger the percentage of other people living in the same community who do not adhere to the social norm (Clark, 1999: 2) .
Therefore, in panel B of Table 5 , the variable for the strength of the work norm, as well as the local unemployment rate, are jointly included in the estimate. The coefficients show that the interaction effect for the social work norm hardly changes: it is slightly reduced from -0.05 to -0.04. A stronger norm to work thus reduces the subjective well-being of unemployed people, even if we control for the local unemployment situation.
The local unemployment rate itself has a small, albeit statistically insignificant, positive effect on satisfaction with life of people looking for a job. This rise in unemployed people's well-being due to higher unemployment in their area of residence has previously been interpreted as evidence for the effect of social norms (see Clark, 1999 ). The interpretation is that a weaker adherence to the norm to work eases the lot of unemployed people. However, if a direct measure of the strength of the social norm is controlled for, average behavior as a norm-proxy loses its explanatory power of unemployed individuals' well-being.
Conclusions
Social norms are presumed to be an important determinant of behavior in situations that involve externalities. For instance, social norms may contribute to understanding the puzzling fact that unemployment rates show large unexplained regional variation. However, research on the empirical relevance of social norms is hampered because it is difficult to measure the degree to which social norms prevail within a group.
In this paper, a novel measure of the social norm to work is applied. The main advantage of this measure is that it goes beyond average labor market behavior. It captures citizens' beliefs that people should live off their own income, as expressed by voters in a referendum on the reduction of unemployment benefits.
First, we test whether this social norm is an important determinant of unemployed people's behavior. We find that the stronger the social norm to work, the shorter is the duration of unemployment. The effect is stronger in small communities, and for unemployed people whose mother tongue is the local language. A one standard deviation increase in the strength of the social work norm translates, on average, into a reduction of unemployment duration by approximately 11 days.
Second, evidence is offered that explains the effect of the social work norm on job searching.
One would expect either that unemployed people's utility is the lower, the stronger the social norm to work, if it captures social pressure, or that there is no systematic relationship if the proposed measure for the social norm captures imitation, learning or social support. We find that the stronger the social norm to work, the lower is reported satisfaction with life of unemployed people. A social norm to work that is one standard deviation stronger than average reduces the probability of high satisfaction scores by 17.1 percentage points. The proxy for the social work norm used in this paper thus reflects the extent to which unemployed individuals are subject to informal social sanctions.
One implication of these results is that, for given transfers, a stronger social norm to work allows unemployed people to be financed for longer or with higher unemployment benefits.
Showing the large effect of a strong norm to work raises the question of the institutional determinants of this norm. Possible answers are a worthwhile topic for future research. Till now, there is scarce systematic empirical evidence on the emergence of social norms. It is to be hoped 28 that the results presented in this study are replicated and that they are supplemented with studies on the effects of social norms on total employment, self-employment and entrepreneurship. Number of individuals 76770 76770 76770 Notes: "Yes" indicates that the respective control variables are included. Unemployment inflow rate is the average number of individuals who entered unemployment in July to September 1997 as a percentage of the labor force in the community. Individual characteristics are age, family situation, nationality, apprenticeship training, employability, replacement rate, previous wage, the previous labor market state, industry, occupation, mobility, average unemployment duration in the previous two years, knowledge of the local language and dummies for inflow period. Data sources: State Secretariat of Economic Affairs, Switzerland and data service of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Notes: Simulations refer to the individual with average characteristics; coefficient estimates are taken from Panel C in Table 2 and Table A2 . .06
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Data source: Data service of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
